analyzing-macro-malware-in-office-documents
Analyzes malicious VBA macros embedded in Microsoft Office documents (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) to identify download cradles, payload execution, persistence mechanisms, and anti-analysis techniques. Uses olevba, oledump, and VBA deobfuscation to extract the attack chain. Activates for requests involving Office macro analysis, VBA malware investigation, maldoc analysis, or document-based threat examination.
What this skill does
# Analyzing Macro Malware in Office Documents
## When to Use
- A suspicious Office document (.doc, .docm, .xls, .xlsm, .ppt) has been flagged by email security
- Investigating phishing campaigns that deliver weaponized Office documents
- Extracting VBA macro code to identify the payload download URL and execution method
- Analyzing obfuscated VBA code to understand the full attack chain
- Determining if a document uses DDE, ActiveX, or remote template injection instead of macros
**Do not use** for analyzing non-macro Office threats (DDE, remote template injection); while this skill covers detection of these, specialized analysis may be needed.
## Prerequisites
- Python 3.8+ with oletools installed (`pip install oletools`)
- oledump.py from Didier Stevens (https://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/oledump-py/)
- Isolated analysis VM without Microsoft Office installed (prevents accidental execution)
- XLMDeobfuscator for Excel 4.0 macro analysis (pip install xlmdeobfuscator)
- LibreOffice for safe document rendering (does not execute VBA macros by default)
## Workflow
### Step 1: Initial Document Triage
Determine if the document contains macros or other active content:
```bash
# Quick triage with olevba
olevba suspect.docm
# Check for OLE streams and macros
oleid suspect.docm
# Output indicators:
# VBA Macros: True/False
# XLM Macros: True/False
# External Relationships: True/False (remote template)
# ObjectPool: True/False (embedded objects)
# Flash: True/False (SWF objects)
# Comprehensive OLE analysis
oledump.py suspect.docm
# List all OLE streams with macro indicators
# Streams marked with 'M' contain VBA macros
# Streams marked with 'm' contain macro attributes
```
### Step 2: Extract and Analyze VBA Code
Pull out the complete VBA macro source:
```bash
# Extract VBA with full deobfuscation
olevba --decode --deobf suspect.docm
# Extract just the VBA source code
olevba --code suspect.docm > extracted_vba.txt
# Detailed extraction with oledump
oledump.py -s 8 -v suspect.docm # Stream 8 (adjust based on stream listing)
# Extract all macro streams
oledump.py -p plugin_vba_dco suspect.docm
```
```
Key VBA Elements to Identify:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Auto-Execution Triggers:
- Auto_Open / AutoOpen (Word)
- Auto_Close / AutoClose
- Document_Open / Document_Close
- Workbook_Open (Excel)
- AutoExec
Suspicious Functions:
- Shell() / Shell.Application
- WScript.Shell.Run / Exec
- CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
- PowerShell execution
- URLDownloadToFile
- MSXML2.XMLHTTP (HTTP requests)
- ADODB.Stream (file writing)
- Environ() (environment variables)
- CallByName (indirect method calls)
```
### Step 3: Deobfuscate VBA Code
Remove obfuscation layers to reveal the payload:
```python
# VBA deobfuscation techniques
import re
def deobfuscate_vba(code):
# 1. Resolve Chr() calls: Chr(104) & Chr(116) -> "ht"
def resolve_chr(match):
try:
return chr(int(match.group(1)))
except:
return match.group(0)
code = re.sub(r'Chr\$?\((\d+)\)', resolve_chr, code)
# 2. Remove string concatenation: "htt" & "p://" -> "http://"
code = re.sub(r'"\s*&\s*"', '', code)
# 3. Resolve ChrW calls: ChrW(104)
code = re.sub(r'ChrW\$?\((\d+)\)', resolve_chr, code)
# 4. Resolve StrReverse: StrReverse("exe.daolnwod") -> "download.exe"
def resolve_reverse(match):
return '"' + match.group(1)[::-1] + '"'
code = re.sub(r'StrReverse\("([^"]+)"\)', resolve_reverse, code)
# 5. Remove Mid$/Left$/Right$ obfuscation (complex, mark for manual review)
# 6. Resolve Replace(): Replace("Powxershxell", "x", "")
def resolve_replace(match):
original = match.group(1)
find = match.group(2)
replace_with = match.group(3)
return '"' + original.replace(find, replace_with) + '"'
code = re.sub(r'Replace\("([^"]+)",\s*"([^"]+)",\s*"([^"]*)"\)', resolve_replace, code)
return code
with open("extracted_vba.txt") as f:
vba_code = f.read()
deobfuscated = deobfuscate_vba(vba_code)
print(deobfuscated)
```
### Step 4: Analyze Excel 4.0 (XLM) Macros
Handle legacy Excel macros that bypass VBA detection:
```bash
# Detect XLM macros
olevba --xlm suspect.xlsm
# Deobfuscate XLM macros
xlmdeobfuscator -f suspect.xlsm
# Manual XLM analysis with oledump
oledump.py suspect.xlsm -p plugin_biff.py
# XLM (Excel 4.0) macro functions to watch for:
# EXEC() - Execute shell command
# CALL() - Call DLL function
# REGISTER() - Register DLL function
# URLDownloadToFileA - Download file
# ALERT() - Display message (social engineering)
# HALT() - Stop execution
# GOTO() - Control flow
# IF() - Conditional execution
```
### Step 5: Check for Non-Macro Attack Vectors
Examine the document for DDE, remote templates, and embedded objects:
```bash
# Check for DDE (Dynamic Data Exchange)
python3 -c "
import zipfile
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
import re
z = zipfile.ZipFile('suspect.docx')
for name in z.namelist():
if name.endswith('.xml') or name.endswith('.rels'):
content = z.read(name).decode('utf-8', errors='ignore')
# DDE field codes
if 'DDEAUTO' in content or 'DDE ' in content:
print(f'[!] DDE found in {name}')
dde_match = re.findall(r'DDEAUTO[^\"]*\"([^\"]+)\"', content)
for m in dde_match:
print(f' Command: {m}')
# Remote template
if 'attachedTemplate' in content or 'Target=' in content:
urls = re.findall(r'Target=\"(https?://[^\"]+)\"', content)
for url in urls:
print(f'[!] Remote template URL: {url}')
"
# Check for embedded OLE objects
oledump.py -p plugin_msg.py suspect.docm
# Check relationships for external references
python3 -c "
import zipfile
z = zipfile.ZipFile('suspect.docx')
for name in z.namelist():
if '.rels' in name:
content = z.read(name).decode('utf-8', errors='ignore')
if 'http' in content.lower() or 'ftp' in content.lower():
print(f'External reference in {name}:')
import re
urls = re.findall(r'Target=\"([^\"]+)\"', content)
for url in urls:
print(f' {url}')
"
```
### Step 6: Generate Analysis Report
Document the complete macro malware analysis:
```
Report should include:
- Document metadata (author, creation date, modification date)
- Macro presence and type (VBA, XLM, DDE, remote template)
- Auto-execution trigger identified
- Deobfuscated VBA source code (key functions)
- Download URL(s) for second-stage payloads
- Execution method (Shell, WScript, PowerShell, COM object)
- Social engineering lure description
- Extracted IOCs (URLs, domains, IPs, file hashes)
- YARA rule for the specific document pattern
```
## Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|------|------------|
| **VBA Macro** | Visual Basic for Applications code embedded in Office documents that can interact with the OS, download files, and execute commands |
| **Auto_Open** | VBA event procedure that executes automatically when a Word document is opened, the primary trigger for macro malware |
| **OLE (Object Linking and Embedding)** | Microsoft compound document format; Office documents are OLE containers with streams that can contain macros and objects |
| **DDE (Dynamic Data Exchange)** | Legacy Windows IPC mechanism abused in documents to execute commands without macros; triggered by field code updates |
| **Remote Template Injection** | Attack loading a macro-enabled template from a remote URL when the document opens, bypassing initial macro detection |
| **XLM Macros (Excel 4.0)** | Legacy Excel macro language predating VBA; stored in hidden sheets and often missed by traditional VBA analysis tools |
| **Protected View** | Office sandbox that prevents macro execution until the user clicks "Enable Content"; social engineering targets this barrier |
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