aws-iam-best-practices
IAM policy review, hardening, and least privilege implementation
What this skill does
# AWS IAM Best Practices
Review and harden IAM policies following AWS security best practices and least privilege principles.
## When to Use
Use this skill when you need to review IAM policies, implement least privilege access, or harden IAM security.
## Core Principles
**Least Privilege**
- Grant minimum permissions needed
- Use managed policies when possible
- Avoid wildcard (*) permissions
- Regular access reviews
**Defense in Depth**
- Enable MFA for all users
- Use IAM roles instead of access keys
- Implement service control policies (SCPs)
- Enable CloudTrail for audit
**Separation of Duties**
- Separate admin and user roles
- Use different roles for different environments
- Implement approval workflows
- Regular permission audits
## IAM Security Checks
### Find Overly Permissive Policies
```bash
# List policies with full admin access
aws iam list-policies --scope Local \
--query 'Policies[*].[PolicyName,Arn]' --output table | \
grep -i admin
# Find policies with wildcard actions
aws iam list-policies --scope Local --query 'Policies[*].Arn' --output text | \
while read arn; do
version=$(aws iam get-policy --policy-arn "$arn" \
--query 'Policy.DefaultVersionId' --output text)
doc=$(aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn "$arn" \
--version-id "$version" --query 'PolicyVersion.Document')
if echo "$doc" | grep -q '"Action": "\*"'; then
echo "Wildcard action in: $arn"
fi
done
# Find inline policies (should use managed policies)
aws iam list-users --query 'Users[*].UserName' --output text | \
while read user; do
policies=$(aws iam list-user-policies --user-name "$user" \
--query 'PolicyNames' --output text)
if [ -n "$policies" ]; then
echo "Inline policies on user $user: $policies"
fi
done
```
### MFA Enforcement
```bash
# List users without MFA
aws iam get-credential-report --output text | \
awk -F, 'NR>1 && $4=="false" {print $1}'
# Check if MFA is required in policies
aws iam list-policies --scope Local --query 'Policies[*].Arn' --output text | \
while read arn; do
version=$(aws iam get-policy --policy-arn "$arn" \
--query 'Policy.DefaultVersionId' --output text)
doc=$(aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn "$arn" \
--version-id "$version" --query 'PolicyVersion.Document')
if echo "$doc" | grep -q "aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent"; then
echo "MFA enforced in: $arn"
fi
done
# Enable MFA for a user (returns QR code)
aws iam create-virtual-mfa-device \
--virtual-mfa-device-name user-mfa \
--outfile /tmp/qr.png \
--bootstrap-method QRCodePNG
```
### Access Key Management
```bash
# Find old access keys (>90 days)
aws iam list-users --query 'Users[*].UserName' --output text | \
while read user; do
aws iam list-access-keys --user-name "$user" \
--query 'AccessKeyMetadata[*].[AccessKeyId,CreateDate,Status]' \
--output text | \
while read key_id create_date status; do
age_days=$(( ($(date +%s) - $(date -d "$create_date" +%s)) / 86400 ))
if [ $age_days -gt 90 ]; then
echo "$user: Key $key_id is $age_days days old"
fi
done
done
# Rotate access key
OLD_KEY="<AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID>"
USER="myuser"
# Create new key
NEW_KEY=$(aws iam create-access-key --user-name "$USER")
echo "New key created. Update applications, then run:"
echo "aws iam delete-access-key --user-name $USER --access-key-id $OLD_KEY"
# Deactivate old key (test first)
aws iam update-access-key \
--user-name "$USER" \
--access-key-id "$OLD_KEY" \
--status Inactive
```
### Role and Policy Analysis
```bash
# List unused roles (no activity in 90 days)
aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[*].[RoleName,RoleLastUsed.LastUsedDate]' \
--output text | \
while read role last_used; do
if [ "$last_used" = "None" ]; then
echo "Never used: $role"
fi
done
# Find roles with trust relationships to external accounts
aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[*].RoleName' --output text | \
while read role; do
trust=$(aws iam get-role --role-name "$role" \
--query 'Role.AssumeRolePolicyDocument')
if echo "$trust" | grep -q '"AWS":'; then
echo "External trust: $role"
fi
done
# Analyze policy permissions
aws iam simulate-principal-policy \
--policy-source-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/myuser \
--action-names s3:GetObject s3:PutObject \
--resource-arns arn:aws:s3:::mybucket/*
```
## IAM Policy Templates
### Least Privilege S3 Access
```json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"s3:GetObject",
"s3:PutObject"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket/user-data/${aws:username}/*"
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": "s3:ListBucket",
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket",
"Condition": {
"StringLike": {
"s3:prefix": "user-data/${aws:username}/*"
}
}
}
]
}
```
### MFA-Required Policy
```json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": "*",
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": {
"BoolIfExists": {
"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent": "false"
}
}
}
]
}
```
### Time-Based Access
```json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": "ec2:*",
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": {
"DateGreaterThan": {
"aws:CurrentTime": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
},
"DateLessThan": {
"aws:CurrentTime": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z"
}
}
}
]
}
```
### IP-Restricted Access
```json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": "*",
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": {
"NotIpAddress": {
"aws:SourceIp": [
"203.0.113.0/24",
"198.51.100.0/24"
]
}
}
}
]
}
```
## IAM Hardening Checklist
**User Management**
- [ ] Enable MFA for all users
- [ ] Remove unused IAM users
- [ ] Rotate access keys every 90 days
- [ ] Use IAM roles instead of long-term credentials
- [ ] Implement password policy (length, complexity, rotation)
**Policy Management**
- [ ] Replace inline policies with managed policies
- [ ] Remove wildcard (*) permissions
- [ ] Implement least privilege
- [ ] Use policy conditions (MFA, IP, time)
- [ ] Regular policy reviews
**Role Management**
- [ ] Use roles for EC2 instances
- [ ] Implement cross-account roles properly
- [ ] Review trust relationships
- [ ] Remove unused roles
- [ ] Use session tags for fine-grained access
**Monitoring**
- [ ] Enable CloudTrail for IAM events
- [ ] Set up CloudWatch alarms for IAM changes
- [ ] Use AWS IAM Access Analyzer
- [ ] Regular access reviews
- [ ] Monitor for privilege escalation
## Automated IAM Hardening
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# iam-hardening.py
import boto3
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
iam = boto3.client('iam')
def enforce_mfa():
"""Identify users without MFA"""
users = iam.list_users()['Users']
no_mfa = []
for user in users:
mfa_devices = iam.list_mfa_devices(
UserName=user['UserName']
)['MFADevices']
if not mfa_devices:
no_mfa.append(user['UserName'])
return no_mfa
def rotate_old_keys():
"""Find access keys older than 90 days"""
users = iam.list_users()['Users']
old_keys = []
for user in users:
keys = iam.list_access_keys(
UserName=user['UserName']
)['AccessKeyMetadata']
for key in keys:
age = datetime.now(key['CreateDate'].tzinfo) - key['CreateDate']
if age.days > 90:
old_keys.append({
'user': user['UserName'],
'key_id': key['AccessKeyId'],
'age_days': age.days
})
return old_keys
def find_overpermissive_policies():
"""Find policies with wildcard actions"""
policies = iam.list_policRelated in security
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