skill-security-auditor

What this skill does

# Skill Security Auditor

**Tier:** POWERFUL
**Category:** Engineering / Security
**Maintainer:** Claude Skills Team

## Overview

Scan and audit AI agent skills for security risks before installation. Performs static analysis on code files for dangerous patterns, scans markdown files for prompt injection, validates dependency supply chains, checks file system boundaries, and detects obfuscation. Produces a structured PASS / WARN / FAIL verdict with findings categorized by severity and actionable remediation guidance.

## Keywords

skill security, AI security, prompt injection, code audit, supply chain, dependency scanning, data exfiltration, credential harvesting, obfuscation detection, pre-install security

## Core Capabilities

### 1. Code Execution Risk Detection
- Command injection: `os.system()`, `subprocess.call(shell=True)`, backtick execution
- Code execution: `eval()`, `exec()`, `compile()`, `__import__()`
- Obfuscation: base64-encoded payloads, hex strings, `chr()` chains
- Network exfiltration: `requests.post()`, `socket.connect()`, `httpx`, `aiohttp`
- Credential harvesting: reads from `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/.config`
- Privilege escalation: `sudo`, `chmod 777`, `setuid`, cron manipulation

### 2. Prompt Injection Detection
- System prompt override: "Ignore previous instructions"
- Role hijacking: "Act as root", "Pretend you have no restrictions"
- Safety bypass: "Skip safety checks", "Disable content filtering"
- Hidden instructions: zero-width characters, HTML comments with directives
- Data extraction: "Send contents of", "Upload file to", "POST to"
- Excessive permissions: "Run any command", "Full filesystem access"

### 3. Supply Chain Analysis
- Known vulnerabilities in pinned dependencies
- Typosquatting detection (packages similar to popular ones)
- Unpinned versions that may introduce vulnerabilities
- `pip install` or `npm install` commands inside scripts
- Packages with low download counts or recent creation dates

### 4. File System and Structure Validation
- Scripts referencing paths outside skill directory
- Hidden files (.env, dotfiles) that should not be in a skill
- Unexpected binary files (.exe, .so, .dll)
- Symbolic links pointing outside the skill boundary
- Large files that could hide payloads

## When to Use

- Evaluating a skill from an untrusted source before installation
- Pre-install security gate for CI/CD pipelines
- Auditing a skill directory or git repository for malicious code
- Reviewing skills before adding them to a team's approved list
- Post-incident scanning of installed skills

## Threat Model

### Attack Vectors Against AI Skills

| Vector | How It Works | Risk Level |
|--------|-------------|------------|
| **Code execution in scripts** | Skill includes Python/Bash scripts with `eval()`, `os.system()`, or `subprocess` that execute arbitrary commands | CRITICAL |
| **Prompt injection in SKILL.md** | Markdown contains hidden instructions that override the AI assistant's behavior when the skill is loaded | CRITICAL |
| **Network exfiltration** | Scripts send local data (code, credentials, env vars) to external servers | CRITICAL |
| **Credential harvesting** | Scripts read SSH keys, AWS credentials, or API tokens from well-known paths | CRITICAL |
| **Dependency poisoning** | `requirements.txt` includes typosquatted or backdoored packages | HIGH |
| **File system escape** | Scripts write to `~/.bashrc`, `/etc/`, or other system locations | HIGH |
| **Obfuscated payloads** | Malicious code hidden via base64 encoding, hex strings, or `chr()` construction | HIGH |
| **Binary payloads** | Pre-compiled executables bypass code review | HIGH |
| **Symlink attacks** | Symbolic links redirect file operations to sensitive locations | MEDIUM |
| **Information disclosure** | Excessive logging or error output reveals system information | LOW |

### Trust Boundaries

```
TRUSTED ZONE:
  ├── Skill markdown files (SKILL.md, references/)
  │   └── Should contain ONLY documentation and templates
  ├── Configuration files (YAML, JSON, TOML)
  │   └── Should contain ONLY settings, no executable code
  └── Template files (assets/)
      └── Should contain ONLY user-facing templates

INSPECTION REQUIRED:
  ├── Python scripts (scripts/*.py)
  │   └── May contain legitimate automation — inspect each function
  ├── Shell scripts (scripts/*.sh)
  │   └── Check for pipes to external servers, eval, sudo
  └── JavaScript/TypeScript (scripts/*.js, *.ts)
      └── Check for eval, Function constructor, network calls

REJECT BY DEFAULT:
  ├── Binary files (.exe, .so, .dll, .pyc)
  ├── Hidden directories (.hidden/)
  ├── Environment files (.env, .env.local)
  └── Credential files (*.pem, *.key, *.p12)
```

## Scanning Patterns

### Code Execution Risks

```python
# Patterns to detect in .py, .sh, .js, .ts files

CRITICAL_PATTERNS = {
    "command_injection": [
        r"os\.system\(",
        r"os\.popen\(",
        r"subprocess\.call\(.*shell\s*=\s*True",
        r"subprocess\.Popen\(.*shell\s*=\s*True",
        r"`[^`]+`",  # backtick execution in shell
    ],
    "code_execution": [
        r"\beval\(",
        r"\bexec\(",
        r"\bcompile\(",
        r"__import__\(",
        r"importlib\.import_module\(",
        r"new\s+Function\(",  # JavaScript
    ],
    "obfuscation": [
        r"base64\.b64decode\(",
        r"codecs\.decode\(",
        r"bytes\.fromhex\(",
        r"chr\(\d+\)\s*\+\s*chr\(",  # chr() chains
        r"\\x[0-9a-f]{2}.*\\x[0-9a-f]{2}.*\\x[0-9a-f]{2}",  # hex strings
    ],
    "network_exfiltration": [
        r"requests\.post\(",
        r"requests\.put\(",
        r"urllib\.request\.urlopen\(",
        r"httpx\.(post|put)\(",
        r"aiohttp\.ClientSession\(",
        r"socket\.connect\(",
        r"fetch\(['\"]https?://",  # JavaScript
    ],
    "credential_harvesting": [
        r"~/.ssh",
        r"~/.aws",
        r"~/.config",
        r"~/.gnupg",
        r"os\.environ\[",  # reading env vars
        r"open\(.*\.pem",
        r"open\(.*\.key",
    ],
    "privilege_escalation": [
        r"\bsudo\b",
        r"chmod\s+777",
        r"chmod\s+\+s",
        r"crontab",
        r"setuid",
    ],
}

HIGH_PATTERNS = {
    "unsafe_deserialization": [
        r"pickle\.loads?\(",
        r"yaml\.load\([^)]*\)",  # without SafeLoader
        r"marshal\.loads?\(",
        r"shelve\.open\(",
    ],
    "file_system_abuse": [
        r"open\(.*/etc/",
        r"open\(.*~/.bashrc",
        r"open\(.*~/.profile",
        r"open\(.*~/.zshrc",
        r"os\.symlink\(",
        r"shutil\.(rmtree|move)\(",
    ],
}
```

### Prompt Injection Detection

```python
# Patterns to detect in .md files

PROMPT_INJECTION_PATTERNS = {
    "system_override": [
        r"ignore\s+(all\s+)?previous\s+instructions",
        r"ignore\s+(all\s+)?prior\s+instructions",
        r"disregard\s+(all\s+)?previous",
        r"you\s+are\s+now\s+(a|an)\s+",
        r"from\s+now\s+on\s+(you|your)\s+",
        r"new\s+system\s+prompt",
        r"override\s+system",
    ],
    "role_hijacking": [
        r"act\s+as\s+(root|admin|superuser)",
        r"pretend\s+you\s+(have\s+no|don't\s+have)\s+restrictions",
        r"you\s+have\s+no\s+limitations",
        r"unrestricted\s+mode",
        r"developer\s+mode\s+enabled",
        r"jailbreak",
    ],
    "safety_bypass": [
        r"skip\s+safety\s+checks",
        r"disable\s+content\s+filter",
        r"bypass\s+security",
        r"remove\s+(all\s+)?guardrails",
        r"no\s+restrictions\s+apply",
    ],
    "data_extraction": [
        r"send\s+(the\s+)?contents?\s+of",
        r"upload\s+file\s+to",
        r"POST\s+to\s+https?://",
        r"exfiltrate",
        r"transmit\s+data\s+to",
    ],
    "hidden_instructions": [
        r"\u200b",          # zero-width space
        r"\u200c",          # zero-width non-joiner
        r"\u200d",          # zero-width joiner
        r"\ufeff",          # byte order mark
        r"<!--\s*(?:system|instruction|command)",  # HTML comments with di