twilio-security-hardening

What this skill does

## Overview

Security hardening is an **ongoing** concern — not a one-time setup. This skill covers account-level security decisions and application-level protection patterns that prevent credential leaks, fraud, and compliance violations.

**Lifecycle:** Choose numbers (`twilio-numbers-senders`) → Register (`twilio-compliance-onboarding`) → Follow traffic rules (`twilio-compliance-traffic`) → Secure everything (this skill)

---

## Credential Management

### API Keys vs Auth Tokens

| Credential | Scope | Revocable | Use when |
|-----------|-------|-----------|----------|
| **Auth Token** | Full account access | Only by rotating (invalidates all token-based integrations and webhook signature validation — API keys unaffected) | Avoid in production — use API keys instead |
| **API Key + Secret** | Scoped, revocable individually | Yes — revoke one without affecting others | Production applications, CI/CD, server-side code |
| **Access Tokens** | Short-lived, client-specific | Expire automatically | Client-side SDKs (Voice, Video, Conversations) |

**Critical gotcha:** Rotating your Auth Token invalidates all integrations authenticating with `AccountSID:AuthToken` and breaks webhook signature validation — it does NOT affect API keys (SK-prefixed), which are independent. Use API keys from the start so you rarely need to rotate the Auth Token.

### Best Practices

- Store credentials in environment variables or a secrets manager — never in code
- Use different API keys per application/environment
- Rotate API keys on a schedule (quarterly minimum, monthly for HIPAA)
- Use sub-accounts to isolate customer credentials for ISV platforms — see `twilio-account-setup`

**Docs:** See `twilio-iam-auth-setup` for full credential setup patterns.

---

## Request Validation (Webhook Security)

Verify that webhook requests actually come from Twilio — not spoofed by attackers.

### X-Twilio-Signature Validation

Always use the SDK validator — don't implement HMAC-SHA1 manually:

**Node.js**
```javascript
const twilio = require("twilio");

app.post("/sms", (req, res) => {
    const valid = twilio.validateRequest(
        process.env.TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN,
        req.headers["x-twilio-signature"],
        `https://yourdomain.com/sms`,
        req.body
    );
    if (!valid) return res.status(403).send("Forbidden");
    // Process webhook...
});
```

**Note:** Webhook signature validation always uses your Auth Token — not an API Key Secret. This is the one legitimate production use of the Auth Token. Keep it accessible for request validation but store it securely (environment variable or secrets manager).

**Common mistakes:**
- Using HTTP URL when Twilio sends to HTTPS (URL must match exactly)
- Forgetting to include query string parameters in validation URL
- Not validating in production because "it worked in dev without it"

**Docs:** See `twilio-webhook-architecture` for full webhook security patterns.

---

## Account-Level Compliance

### PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry)

**PCI Mode is IRREVERSIBLE and account-wide.** Once enabled, it cannot be disabled — ever.

- All recordings are encrypted
- Transcript access is restricted
- Affects every service on the account

**Recommendation:** If you need PCI compliance for one use case, create a **separate sub-account** dedicated to payment-related calls. See `twilio-account-setup` for sub-account patterns.

For call recording during payment, pause recording when the customer gives card numbers:
```python
client.calls(call_sid).recordings(recording_sid).update(status="paused")
```

Or use the `<Pay>` verb to handle payments without your application touching card data:
```xml
<Pay paymentConnector="stripe_connector" chargeAmount="49.99" currency="usd" />
```

### HIPAA (Healthcare)

Before handling Protected Health Information (PHI):
- **Execute a BAA** (Business Associate Agreement) with Twilio — contact your account manager or [submit a sales request](https://www.twilio.com/en-us/help/sales) if you don't have one
- **Encrypt all recordings** containing PHI
- **Minimize PHI in TTS** — don't speak full patient details via `<Say>`
- **Rotate API keys** on a regular schedule
- **Restrict access** to recordings and transcripts

---

## Fraud Prevention

### SMS Pumping Protection

Attackers trigger thousands of OTP messages to premium-rate numbers, generating toll charges.

**Layered defense:**
1. **Twilio Verify Fraud Guard** — built-in fraud detection (enable on Verify Service)
2. **Lookup pre-check** — call `twilio-lookup-phone-intelligence` to check line type + SMS pumping risk score before sending
3. **Geo-permissions** — restrict SMS/voice to countries where you have customers ([Console > Messaging > Geo Permissions](https://console.twilio.com))
4. **Rate limiting** — limit verification attempts per IP, per phone number, per time window

### Geo-Permissions

Restrict which countries can receive messages or calls from your account:
- Disable all countries you don't serve (SMS and Voice separately)
- Re-enable only as needed — [configure in Console](https://www.twilio.com/docs/messaging/guides/sms-geo-permissions)
- This is the single most effective anti-fraud measure for SMS pumping

**SMS pumping impact:** Incidents can climb into tens of thousands of dollars. Twilio does not publish most-targeted prefixes — the general guidance is to restrict message termination to countries where you do business via geo-permissions. Customers using Fraud Guard can view estimated fraud savings in their [Fraud Guard reports](https://www.twilio.com/docs/verify/preventing-toll-fraud/sms-fraud-guard).

---

## Common Mistakes

1. **Auth Token in code** — Pushed to GitHub, leaked. Use environment variables + API keys.
2. **No webhook validation** — Attackers can send fake webhook requests to your endpoints.
3. **PCI Mode on main account** — Irreversible. Use a sub-account for payment use cases.
4. **No geo-permissions** — Account is open to SMS pumping from any country.
5. **Auth Token rotation without planning** — Breaks all integrations using `AccountSID:AuthToken` and webhook signature validation simultaneously. API keys are unaffected.

---

## Credential Rotation (Zero-Downtime)

Both API keys and Auth Tokens follow the same workflow:

1. **Create secondary** — generate a new API key (or note the new Auth Token)
2. **Operationalize secondary** — deploy the new credential to all services
3. **Promote secondary to primary** — verify all traffic uses the new credential
4. **Delete old primary** — revoke the previous credential

Manage keys at: `https://console.twilio.com/account/keys-credentials/api-keys` (per account).

**Key enabler: use a secrets manager** (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, etc.) to inject credentials at runtime. This makes rotation near-instantaneous with no downtime — no code changes, no redeployments. Organizations that hard-code credentials into repos, deployment scripts, or `.env` files must manually update every location before deleting the old key.

For ISVs managing many sub-accounts, automate this with the API Keys REST API across accounts.

---

## Next Steps

- **Credential setup and API key management:** `twilio-iam-auth-setup`
- **Webhook security and signature validation:** `twilio-webhook-architecture`
- **Account structure and sub-accounts:** `twilio-account-setup`
- **Phone intelligence for fraud scoring:** `twilio-lookup-phone-intelligence`
- **Traffic compliance rules:** `twilio-compliance-traffic`