vtex-io-rbac
Apply when controlling access to VTEX IO app resources using role-based or resource-based policies. Covers policies.json for role-based access control, service.json policies for resource-based access, VRN syntax for principals, the difference between app-to-app and user/integration access, and GraphQL @auth directives. Use when deciding how to secure routes and restrict which apps, users, or integrations can access your endpoints.
What this skill does
# VTEX IO access control (RBAC)
## When this skill applies
Use this skill when you need to **control who can access** your VTEX IO app's routes and resources:
- Deciding between **role-based** (`policies.json`) and **resource-based** (`service.json` policies) access control
- Securing **REST endpoints** so only specific apps, users, or API keys can call them
- Setting up **GraphQL authorization** with the `@auth` directive
- Understanding **VRN** (VTEX Resource Name) syntax for declaring principals
- Debugging **403 Forbidden** errors caused by missing or misconfigured policies
Do not use this skill for:
- General service architecture (use `vtex-io-service-apps`)
- PCI compliance and payment security (use `payment-pci-security`)
- Route prefix and CDN behavior (use `vtex-io-service-paths-and-cdn`)
## Decision rules
### Role-based vs resource-based policies
| | Role-based (`policies.json`) | Resource-based (`service.json` policies) |
| -------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Who can call?** | Only other IO apps (by themselves or on behalf of other apps) | Apps, users, and integrations (API keys) |
| **API types** | GraphQL and REST | REST only |
| **How callers get access** | Must declare required policies in their `manifest.json` | No policy declaration needed; just call with auth token |
| **Where configured** | `policies.json` in app root | `policies` array inside route definition in `service.json` |
| **Use when** | Exposing GraphQL endpoints; exposing REST endpoints for app-to-app only | Controlling access for users, API keys, or specific apps to REST endpoints |
### Choosing the right approach
- **GraphQL endpoints** → Use **role-based** policies (`policies.json`) **and/or** the **`@auth` directive** in the schema for user-level authorization.
- **REST endpoint called only by other IO apps** → Use **role-based** policies (`policies.json`). Consuming apps must declare the policy in their `manifest.json`.
- **REST endpoint called by users or API keys** → Use **resource-based** policies in `service.json`. Set the route as `"public": false` and define principals.
- **Public REST endpoint (no auth)** → Set `"public": true` in `service.json`. No policies needed, but be aware this means **anyone** can call it.
### VRN syntax
VRNs (VTEX Resource Names) identify resources and principals:
```text
vrn:{service}:{region}:{account}:{workspace}:{path}
```
- **Apps**: `vrn:apps:*:*:*:app/{vendor}.{app-name}@{version}`
- **Users**: `vrn:vtex.vtex-id:*:*:*:user/{email}`
- **API keys**: `vrn:vtex.vtex-id:*:*:*:user/vtexappkey-{account}-{hash}`
- **Wildcards**: `*` matches any value in a segment. `app/*` matches all apps. `user/*@gmail.com` matches all Gmail users.
## Hard constraints
### Constraint: Use resource-based policies when users or API keys need access
Role-based policies only work for **app-to-app** communication. If users (admin or storefront) or integrations (API keys) need to call your endpoint, you **must** use resource-based policies in `service.json` with the route set to `"public": false`.
**Why this matters** — Setting up a role-based policy for a route that users or API keys call results in 403 Forbidden for those callers, because role-based policies don't evaluate user/integration tokens.
**Detection** — A private route that should be callable by admin users or external integrations, but only has `policies.json` configuration and no `policies` array in `service.json`.
**Correct** — Resource-based policy in `service.json` for user/integration access.
```json
{
"routes": {
"orders": {
"path": "/_v/private/my-app/orders",
"public": false,
"policies": [
{
"effect": "allow",
"actions": ["GET", "POST"],
"principals": [
"vrn:vtex.vtex-id:*:*:*:user/*@mycompany.com",
"vrn:apps:*:*:*:app/partner.integration-app@*"
]
}
]
}
}
}
```
**Wrong** — Only `policies.json` for a route that users need.
```json
// policies.json — this only covers app-to-app, not users
[
{
"name": "access-orders",
"statements": [
{
"effect": "allow",
"actions": ["GET"],
"resources": ["vrn:my-app:*:*:*:/_v/private/my-app/orders"]
}
]
}
]
// Users calling this route still get 403
```
### Constraint: Deny policies take precedence over allow policies
When resource-based policies have overlapping principals between an `allow` and a `deny` rule, the **deny** always wins. Be careful with wildcards in allow rules that intersect with specific deny rules.
**Why this matters** — A broad `allow` for `app/*` combined with a specific `deny` for `app/vendor.bad-app@*` correctly blocks `bad-app`. But the reverse—a broad `deny` with a specific `allow`—blocks everything including what you wanted to allow.
**Detection** — Multiple policy entries for the same route with conflicting effects and overlapping principals.
**Correct** — Allow broadly, deny specifically.
```json
{
"policies": [
{
"effect": "allow",
"actions": ["POST"],
"principals": ["vrn:apps:*:*:*:app/*"]
},
{
"effect": "deny",
"actions": ["POST"],
"principals": ["vrn:apps:*:*:*:app/untrusted.app@*"]
}
]
}
```
**Wrong** — Deny broadly, try to allow specifically (the allow is overridden).
```json
{
"policies": [
{
"effect": "deny",
"actions": ["POST"],
"principals": ["vrn:apps:*:*:*:app/*"]
},
{
"effect": "allow",
"actions": ["POST"],
"principals": ["vrn:apps:*:*:*:app/trusted.app@*"]
}
]
}
```
## Preferred pattern
### Role-based policy (`policies.json`)
```json
[
{
"name": "resolve-graphql",
"description": "Allows apps to resolve GraphQL requests",
"statements": [
{
"effect": "allow",
"actions": ["POST"],
"resources": [
"vrn:vtex.store-graphql:{{region}}:{{account}}:{{workspace}}:/_v/graphql"
]
}
]
}
]
```
The consuming app declares the policy in its `manifest.json`:
```json
{
"policies": [
{
"name": "resolve-graphql"
}
]
}
```
### Resource-based policy for mixed access
```json
{
"routes": {
"webhook": {
"path": "/_v/private/my-app/webhook",
"public": false,
"policies": [
{
"effect": "allow",
"actions": ["POST"],
"principals": [
"vrn:apps:*:*:*:app/vtex.orders-broadcast@*",
"vrn:vtex.vtex-id:*:*:*:user/vtexappkey-myaccount-*"
]
}
]
}
}
}
```
### GraphQL `@auth` directive
For GraphQL endpoints, use the `@auth` directive for user-level authorization:
```graphql
type Query {
orders: [Order] @auth(productCode: "10", resourceCode: "list-orders")
adminSettings: Settings
@auth(productCode: "10", resourceCode: "admin-settings")
}
type Mutation {
updateSettings(input: SettingsInput!): Settings
@auth(productCode: "10", resourceCode: "admin-settings")
}
```
The `@auth` directive checks the caller's License Manager role for the specified `productCode` and `resourceCode`.
## Common failure modes
- **403 for users on role-based routes** — Route only has `policies.json`; users and API keys get 403 because role-based policies don't apply to them.
- **Overly broad `public: true`** — Route set to public when it should be private. Anyone can call it without auth.
- **Missing policyRelated in Backend & APIs
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